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Abstract
The Fourth Edition of Professor Valentine Korah’s Introductory Guide to EEC Competition
Law and Practice (the “Guide”) continues her tradition of concise, insightful, and very useful
publications. Since it was first published in 1978, this book and its companion Monographs on
group exemptions have gained a reputation for being invaluable guides for the beginner as well as
a useful starting place for the experienced practitioner. The Guide explains European Economic
Community (”EEC”) competition rules critically, in the light of the Community objectives they
are intended to achieve. The underlying policies and economic theories are also explored.

BOOK REVIEW
AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC COMPETITION
LAW AND PRACTICE. By Valentine Korah. Sweet & Maxwell, London (4th ed., 1990). xli + 269 pp. ISBN 0-406906214-661. UK£18.95.
Reviewed by Joseph P. Griffin*
The Fourth Edition of Professor Valentine Korah's Introductory Guide to EEC Competition Law and Practice' (the "Guide")
continues her tradition of concise, insightful, and very useful
publications. Since it was first published in 1978, this book
and its companion Monographs 2 on group exemptions have
gained a reputation for being invaluable guides for the beginner as well as a useful starting place for the experienced practitioner. The Guide explains European Economic Community
("EEC") competition rules critically, in the light of the Community objectives they are intended to achieve. The underlying policies and economic theories are also explored.
The Guide is divided into fourteen chapters, beginning
with the background of the competition rules and modes of
enforcement. This background includes sections that explain
economic analysis in general and that describe the various
Community institutions. The specific analyses of Articles 85
and 86, the two provisions of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (the "EEC Treaty" or "Treaty")'
addressing competition policy, begins with Chapters 2 and 3,
which analyze Article 85 of the Treaty. Article 85 prohibits
* Managing Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Brussels; Former Chair, American Bar Association Section of International Law and Practice. My gratitude to Michele Floyd of the Journal for her editorial assistance.
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VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO

EEC

COMPETITION LAW AND

PRACTICE (4th ed. 1990) [hereinafter GUIDE].
2. Professor Korah's Monographs on specific aspects of EEC competition law
include: EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION AND THE EEC COMPETITION RULES (1992); KNOWHow LICENSING AGREEMENTS AND THE EEC COMPETITION RULE: REGULATION 556/89

(1989); FRANCHISING (1989); R & D AND THE EEC COMPETITION RULES: REGULATION
418/85 (1986); and PATENT LICENSING AND THE EEC COMPETITION RULES: REGULA-

TION 2349/84 (1985). All are published by Sweet & Maxwell, London.
3. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts.
85, 86, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) [hereinafter
EEC Treaty].
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"agreements between undertakings which may affect trade
between Member States ...and have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
Common Market." ' 4 Article 85 is the provision of the Treaty
that most closely approximates Section 1 of the U.S. Sherman
Act, which prohibits anticompetitive agreements and conspiracies.5
Professor Korah's treatment of Article 85 is more than a
technical exegesis of the text of the Article. She describes the
conceptual and practical difficulties with its original division
into three sections and its often unpredictable interpretation
by the Commission and the Court ofJustice. Article 85(1) contains the general prohibition outlined above. Article 85(2)
provides that the offending provisions of an agreement that infringes Article 85(1) shall be void. Article 85(3) provides for
exemptions from the prohibition for agreements or concerted
practices that meet certain criteria. Even where an agreement
warrants exemption under Article 85(3), practitioners may
confront practical problems in enforcing the agreement. Professor Korah explains that national courts do not have the
power to enforce agreements that may contribute to the production or the distribution of goods, or which may have other
beneficial effects despite their restriction of competition, until
the Commission grants an individual exemption, a process that
can be quite lengthy and highly unlikely to result in a formal
exemption. As Professor Korah observes, in 1988, its best
year, the Commission managed ten such exemptions for almost all sectors of industry and commerce in a Common Market of 320 million people. In the interim, the offending provisions are void. She points out, therefore, that it is important
for drafters of agreements to attempt to fashion agreements
that are not caught by Article 85(1).
Professor Korah continues her critique of the enforcement
of Article 85 by directing the attention of the reader to certain
problems with the reasoning of the Commission and Court of
Justice in defining relevant markets when determining the market power of firms. In comparing the Community's approach
to competition law with that of the United States, Professor
4. Id. art. 85.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
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Korah points out certain shortcomings of the Community approach and warns practitioners of its unpredictable consequences. The Commission and Court, she explains, tend to
consider either supply-side or demand-side substitutability in a
given case, but rarely consider both. The side of the market on
which the Commission and Court focus in any particular case
depends largely on the type of agreement at issue and on
whether the agreement threatens to impede the integration of
the Common Market. Thus, it is difficult to determine exactly
how the Commission or the Court will evaluate a specific legal
and market situation, including the effects of exclusive rights
such as patents, copyrights, trademarks, and distribution and
franchising agreements, which, if viewed ex ante, i.e., at the time
of contracting, might be seen as favorable to competition. In
contrast to U.S. antitrust law, the impact of the decisions of the
Commission and Court on the existence of substitutes on both
sides of the market and the probability that competing firms
may expand their own production of substitutes or enter the
market themselves (i.e., the size of sunk costs or other entry
barriers) on the decisions of the Commission and Court is not
clear.
In Chapter 4, Professor Korah addresses the enforcement
of Article 86, which prohibits any abuse by one or more firms
of a dominant position within a substantial part of the Common Market. This provision resembles Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization. 6 Again, Professor
Korah takes a critical approach to explaining the competing
analyses at work in the interpretation and application of the
Article, and the resulting difficulties for businessmen and practitioners. She reminds her readers that the plain language of
Articles 85 and 86 must be read in light of the broad social,
structural, and consumer interests articulated by Articles 2 and
3 of the Treaty.7 Thus, she warns practitioners, the scope of
Article 86 is broader than its U.S. counterpart because Article
86 also prohibits conduct that harms or affects the structure or
pattern of existing competition. As a result, dominance in the
EEC is broader than the economists' concept of power over
6. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
7. See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 2, 3(f).
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price, and the mere fact of dominance may be seen as abusive.8
The European institutions have not been successful in distinguishing competition on the merits from unacceptable exclusionary practices. They have been more concerned with
protecting competitors than competition. In the United States,
by contrast, "Chicago school" economists and the enforcement authorities tend to be concerned mainly with protecting
those dealing with a dominant firm from exploitation, an objective that only requires controlling firms which are protected
from the competition of equally efficient firms. Professor
Korah goes beyond the bare bones of the law, and includes in
her discussion of "abuse" an explanation of the theory behind
the Court's interpretation. Thus, practitioners and students
are better able to understand the rationale behind the decisions of the Commission and Court, thereby lessening the superficial obscurity of many individual Commission decisions
and Court judgments. In concluding Chapter 4, Professor
Korah discusses the practical consequences of Article 86 from
the perspective of the entrepreneur and consumer. On the basis of the Court's judgment in United Brands Co. and United
Brands Continental B. V v. Commission ("United Brands"),' firms
that meet substantial competition may be treated as dominant
if they have over forty-five percent of the market and if they are
larger than their competitors. As a result, dominance seems to
be decided as a matter of status, independent of any particular
abuse being alleged, and firms with little or no power over
price may find themselves in a dominant position. Moreover,
the prohibition on overcharging by firms with only slight market power is also worrisome because it prohibits unfair prices
without establishing a predictable method of determining fair
prices. Ultimately, Professor Korah considers the somewhat
circular interpretation of Article 86 detrimental to consumers
and the economy as a whole because it subordinates their in8. Professor Korah observes, however, that recently the Court ofJustice has expanded its definitions of relevant geographic and product markets and has been less
willing to confirm a finding of dominance. See, e.g., Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and
Silver Line Reisebiiro GmbH v. Zentrale zur BeUmpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs
e.V., Case 66/86, [1989] E.C.R. 803, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 102; Soci6t6 Alsacienne et
Lorraine de T6l6communications et d'Electronique (Alsatel) v. Novasam SA, Case
247/86, [1988] E.C.R. 5987, [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 434.
9. Case 27/76, [1978] E.C.R. 207, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. 429.
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terests in encouraging efficiency to the interests of smaller
traders in preserving their place in the market.
In addition to the legal interpretations and their impact on
the conduct of undertakings, Professor Korah's Guide is replete
with practical advice for the practicing lawyer. Each chapter
concludes with a useful bibliography of additional reading material on the given subject. For example, Chapter 5 outlines
the steps involved in an inspection by the Commission's enforcement authorities by describing the investigation process
and informing the practitioner of what action to expect the
Commission to take and how to respond most prudently to
Commission action. Professor Korah advises against refusing
the inspectors entry onto the premises of the undertaking inspected, because the inspectors are likely to infer that the undertaking has something to hide. She further advises the practitioner to assemble a committee to greet the inspectors. The
committee should include a lawyer and a "good short hand
secretary," because a record should be made of all documents
that the inspectors request.
Professor Korah then explains the hearing process before
the Commission under Council Regulation No. 17/62 from
both the procedural and the substantive points of view. 10 She
defines the rights of the undertakings involved, such as the
right of the undertaking to be heard before the Commission
renders a decision, and the right of an interested party to intervene in the proceedings. In addition, she explains who the various Commission officials present at the hearing are and what
their duties entail.
More practical advice follows in Chapter 6. Professor
Korah devotes a portion of the chapter to a discussion of
whether undertakings should notify their agreements to the
Commission. Although there is no duty to notify an agreement to the Commission, notification is the only way that undertakings may obtain an exemption or at least a comfort letter. An individual exemption allows the agreement to be enforced in national courts, and spares undertakings from the
threat of nullity and fines. If a comfort letter states that the
agreement does not infringe Article 85, or that it comes within
10. Council Regulation No. 17/62, art. 9(i), 13J.O. 204 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec.
Ed. 1959-62, at 87.
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a group exemption, this may facilitate the enforcement of the
contract because it may be taken into account by a national
court that is asked to enforce it. If the comfort letter, on the
other hand, states that the agreement merits exemption, it may
be dangerous because the national court may infer that the
contract falls within the prohibition of Article 85(1). Because a
national court has no power to exempt, all it can do in this
situation is adjourn to enable the Commission to consider the
grant of a formal exemption. The exemption process is
lengthy, however, and consequently, few exemptions are given
each year. Furthermore, Professor Korah explains, notification
will not help parties to enforce their agreements not yet exempted. The conditions that may be attached to an exemption
may lead to opportunistic renegotiation if the bargaining
power of the parties has shifted since the agreement was made.
Chapter 7 analyzes classes of agreements that are most
clearly prohibited, such as naked cartel agreements, collective
aggregated discounts, export bans, and other tight territorial
distribution restraints at Member State borders. Professor
Korah provides a detailed comparison of conduct in the Community that is clearly prohibited under the case law and conduct in the United States that is per se illegal, and she emphasizes the failure of the Court and Commission to adopt the
U.S. rule of reason. Her discussion is critical of the failure of
the Commission and Court to stress clearly the distinction between naked restraints, which are illegal per se, and ancillary
restraints, which can be legal if reasonable, a distinction made
by Judge William Howard Taft in the seminal U.S. case, United
States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. " Professor Korah is also critical of the Commission's failure to consider free rider arguments as justification for certain restrictive practices. She observes that EEC law, unlike U.S. antitrust law, provides a possibility for exemption in many situations in which U.S. courts
might now hold that competition is not restricted. The bifurcation in EEC law between the prohibition in Article 85(1) and
the possibility of exemption under Article 85(3) allows the
Commission to centralize control in its hands. As Professor
Korah observes, however, this practice is unfortunate because
the Commission lacks the resources to grant many exemptions
11. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified on other grounds, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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and national courts are asked to enforce contracts that they
have no power to exempt. She concludes that although the
Community has not adopted per se rules of illegality, it continually condemns certain types of agreements such as naked horizontal cartels and "absolute territorial protection" which, as a
consequence, should be avoided. For practitioners who find
their clients already engaged in clearly prohibited conduct,
Professor Korah suggests formally terminating the agreement
and implementing an effective system of compliance with the
competition rules.
On the other hand, Professor Korah points out that there
are categories of agreements that the Commission has found
not to pose a threat to competition and that are exempted by
regulation. Chapter 8 includes analyses of the group exemption for exclusive distribution agreements, Commission Regulation No. 1983/83;12 the group exemption for exclusive
purchasing agreements, Commission Regulation No. 1984/
83;'1 and the group exemption for franchising agreements,
Commission Regulation No. 4087/88.' An undertaking can
avoid the notice procedure if the agreement fits into one of
these narrowly and formalistically defined categories. Professor Korah believes, however, that the Commission's tendency
to draft group exemptions in such legalistic detail reduces
legal certainty and impedes the negotiation of many desirable
agreements that fail to meet its strict terms. As she notes,
whether one is trying to protect the public from the extortion
of unfair prices or competitors from foreclosure, the legal nature of the contract is less important than economic analysis
and questions that concern the structure of the market.' 5
Professor Korah's concluding chapter contains a concise,
12. O.J. L 173/1 (1983), corrected by OJ. C 101/2 (1984).
13. O.J. L 173/7 (1983), corrected by OJ. C 101/2 (1984).

14. OJ. L 359 (1988).
15. As Professor Korah comments:

Advisers sometimes persuade their clients to distort a transaction to come
within the straitjacket of one of the group exemptions. This is worrisome.
One great virtue of contracts is that they are infinitely variable and can be
drafted to fit any possible transaction. It would be so much more sensible
for the Commission to develop broader rules, based on openly acknowledged economic considerations as to why particular provisions are or are
not anti-competitive in specified circumstances.
GuIDE, supra note 1, at 233.

1320 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 15:1313
analytical overview of the Guide's discussion of Community
competition law. She criticizes the paucity of the economic
analysis in the Commission's public decisions and its practice
of reciting primary facts without adequate connection to legal
conclusions. The result, as she observes, allows the Commission very wide discretion in reaching its often unpredictable
conclusions, and to lose valuable opportunities to educate
business, legal counsel, national courts and the Court of Justice. Nevertheless, Professor Korah perceives more promising
developments in some recent Commission decisions and, especially, in some recent Court judgments.
As noted earlier, the Commission's view that Article 85(1)
prohibits any restriction of conduct that is significant on the
market is often difficult to reconcile with its conclusions under
Article 85(3). In Professor Korah's opinion, this inconsistency
has begun to undermine the contract law of the Member
States. Certain ancillary restrictions that ex ante are necessary
to make a transaction viable and that may even increase competition are held to restrict competition under Article 85(1)
and then exempted under Article 85(3) on the ground that
they are "necessary and reasonable" to make the transaction
viable. 6 This reasoning is also reflected in the group exemption regulations. In Regulation No. 1983/83,"7 for example,
the Commission lists the ways in which exclusive distribution
agreements help suppliers to penetrate another Member State
market and yet grants an exemption rather than a negative
clearance. Because of the Commission's inability to meet the
demand for individual exemptions, its unwillingness to clear
agreements with ancillary restraints undermines legal certainty
8
and contract law.'
16. See, e.g, Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra, O.J. L 41/31 (1987), [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 111;
BP/Kellogg, OJ. L 369/6 (1985), [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 619.
17. O.J. L 173/1 (1983), corrected by O.J. C 101/2 (1984).
18. In its recent judgment in Delimitis v. Henninger Brau AG, Case C-234/89
(Eur. Ct. J. Feb. 28, 1991) (not yet reported), the Court of Justice was asked by a
Frankfurt court whether a national court had the power to anticipate a formal exemption by the Commission and to treat the contract at issue as valid. The Court replied
that national courts are empowered to treat contracts as valid where there is no
doubt that they do not infringe Article 85(1). In cases in which there is a doubt as to
their clear compatibility or incompatibility, the Court referred national courts to their
duty of cooperation under Article 5 of the EEC Treaty and stated that they might ask
the Commission about the state of its procedure.
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Throughout the Guide Professor Korah emphasizes the
need for greater use of ex ante reasoning in competition analysis: it is at the time that firms consider whether to make their
investment that they must know whether they will be able to
rely on their agreement to appropriate the benefits of their investment. This applies, of course, to the restrictive provisions
of joint venturers contemplating an agreement to share research and development costs and benefits and to those of
dealers and franchisors who may be contemplating investment
and marketing in new territories. As Professor Korah observes, the Commission often succeeds in both having its cake
and eating too, when it compels the parties to renegotiate or to
amend their agreement ex post, once the agreement has been
negotiated and the investment possibly made, in order to allow
free riders to compete. If this occurs too frequently, firms will
become increasingly reluctant to conclude agreements whose
commercial advantages will be altered to the benefit of free
riders.
Nevertheless, Professor Korah sees grounds for optimism,
particularly in some recent Court of Justice judgments that
echo the early and realistic reasoning of Advocate General
Roemer in Etablissements Consten SARL and Grundig-VerkaufsGmbH v. Commission.'" In more recent judgments, such as
Pronuptiade Paris GmbH v. Pronuptiade ParisIrmgard Schillgalis,20
Remia BV and Verenigde Bedrijven NutriciaN. Vv. Commission, 2' and
Erauw-Jacqury SPRL v. La Hesbignonne SC, 22 in areas such as

franchising, covenants on the sale of a business, and absolute
territorial protection for plant breeders' rights, the Court has
been willing to conclude that ancillary restrictions required to
encourage investment by the parties did not infringe Article
85(1).
The following passage from the conclusion illustrates that
the Guide is not a dry academic treatise:
My hope is that [the Court of First Instance] will quash a
few decisions of the Commission for defective reasoning
where the legal appraisal has not been properly related to
19. Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, [1966] E.C.R. 299, [1966] C.M.L.R. 418.
20. Case 161/84, [1986] E.C.R. 353, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 414.

21. Case 42/84, [1985] E.C.R. 2545, [1987] 1 C.M.L.R. I.
22. Case 27/87, [1988] E.C.R. 1919, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 576.
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the facts in order to encourage more lucid analysis. In the
long run,
this should lead to a more effective competition
23
policy.
In his Forward to the book, Judge Rene Joliet of the Court of
Justice agrees with Professor Korah's critique of the "legalistic
and formalistic approach" often taken by European Community officials.
It is no secret that many enforcement officials study Professor Korah's writings and speeches carefully. All those interested in the evolution of European competition policy will
share Professor Korah's hope that these officials are openminded enough to adopt her suggestions.
23. GUIDE, supra note 1, at 236.

